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ABSTRACT 
Buring the cyclical downturn of the 1980's unemployment in the 
Netherlands increased suhstantially, with unemployment rates of lower 
educated worker increasing more than those of higher educated workers. 
A possible explanation of this phenomenon is job competition between 
workers with different levels of education. Another explanation of the 
diverging unemployment rates, is that employers dismiss replaceable 
lower educated workers before irreplaceable higher educated workers. 
In this paper we scrutinize the job competition explanation. Our 
results show that there only is job competition between unemployed 
workers with an academie and a higher vocational education. There is 
no job competition at lower levels of education. 
Keywords: Job competition, matching function, unemployment, vacancies 
JEL classifications: J63, J6A, C13 
*) The authors would like to thank the Dutch Central Bureau of 
Statistics and the Dutch Central Planning Bureau for making the 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
During the cyclical downturn of the 1980's unemployment in the 
Netherlands increased substantially, with unemployment rates of lower 
educated worker increasing more than those of higher educated workers 
(see figure 1). A possible explanation of this phenomenon is job 
competition between workers with different levels of education. If 
employment decreases lower educated workers compete for scarce jobs 
with higher educated workers. This competition may be caused by 
employers, who raise their hiring standards in periods of high 
unemployment (Okun (1981)), but even if hiring standards are constant 
over the cycle higher educated workers may be in the front of the job 
queues for scarce jobs (Thurow (1975)). In both cases, higher educated 
workers will take the jobs previously occupied by lower educated 
workers. 
In this paper we scrutinize the crowding out explanation of the 
negative relationship between unemployment and the level of education. 
We estimate the degree of job competition by analyzing matching by 
educational level for the Dutch labour market of the 1980's. We 
estimate matching functions to investigate whether workers with a 
higher level of education competed successfully for jobs at a lower 
level of education. Our results show that there is only job 
competition between workers with an academie and a higher vocational 
education, while there is no job competition at lower levels of 
education. 
This does not answer the question why unemployment rates 
diverge during a cyclical downturn (and as figure 1 shows, converge 
again during an upturn). Although this question can not be answered 
satisfactorily in the present article, we shall point at some evidence 
that during a downturn employers dismiss workers by educational level. 
If workers with a higher level of education perform specialized tasks, 
that require specific skills, then employers will hang on to such 
irreplaceable workers during a downturn. On the other hand, lower 
educated workers may be easier to replace, so that the burden of 
adjustment is shifted to them. 
The policy implications of the job competition versus the 
differential dismissal explanation of the relation between 
unemployment and level of education are rather different. If job 
competition is important, then schooling is ineffective and only leads 
to a redistribution of unemployment. If employers hang on to better 
educated workers, then schooling may reduce the difference in the 
unemployment rates, and thereby decrease the total unemployment rate. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we di^cuss the 
phenomenon of job competition. Section 3 presents a model of job 
competition by educational level. We hypothesize that the choice of a 
worker to search for a job at a lower educational level depends on the 
wage and the expected duration of unemployment at both educational 
levels. Section 4 discusses the data that we use in the analysis and 
gives the estimation results. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. JOB COMPETITION 
As has been noted many times before, lower educated workers 
have higher unemployment rates than higher educated workers, and the 
difference increases in periods of high unemployment. 
One explanation of this phenomenon is job competition between 
unempioyed workers with different levels of education. Job competition 
occurs if employers prefer higher educated over lower educated workers 
for jobs that were previously occupied by lower educated workers. A 
necessary condition for this is, that employers can choose between 
workers, i.e. that there is a pool of applicants for a job. In Van 
Ours and Ridder (1992) we show that employers select a suitable 
candidate f rom such a pool of applicants. Although this is the normal 
search strategy used by employers in filling vacancies, efficiency 
wage arguments (e.g. Yellen (1984)) that imply that employers pay 
wages above the market clearing level, have been used to argue that 
job queues exist and do not lead to a downward adjustment of wages. 
If unemployment increases and, as a consequence job queues 
lengthen, employers may react by increasing the hiring standards, i.e. 
the required level of education. As argued by Okun (1981), this may be 
an attractive strategy for employers who find it difficult to lower 
wages in times of high unemployment. Using the data that are discussed 
in section 4, we have computed the average required level of education 
of new job vacancies during the 1980's. The results in figure 2 show 
that for the 4 occupational categories there is no evidence that the 
required educational level (measured in years of schooling) has 
increased with the level of unemployment. A simple regression of the 
average required educational level in occupation category j in year t, 
Ej
 t, on the unemployment rate, U^ t, a set of occupational dummy's 
(technical is the reference group), and a time trend confirms this (t-
values): 
Ej.t " u - 6 ' °-47 uj,t + !-57 dmedical + °-89 dclerical " °-^ dsoc-cult + °-03 t J
' (26.2) (1.5) J' (3.3) (2.5) (1.6) (0.8) 
in which: E « average educational level of new vacancies 
U « unemployment 
d = dummy for occupational category 
j • occupational category 
t • time 
If there has been job competition, it was not caused by education 
requirements that increased with the level of unemployment. 
Even if the required level of education does not change over 
the cycle, longer job queues for scarce jobs may put lower educated 
workers at a disadvantage. This viewpoint has been strongly argued by 
Thurow (1975). According to Thurow the traditional wage competition 
labour market model is incorrect. In this model wages are flexible and 
therefore competition between workers eventually clears the labour 
market. In Thurow's view wages are fixed by collective bargaining. 
Productivity is a characteristic of jobs, not of individual workers. 
Education per se does not raise productivity but it is a sign of 
trainability. Potential workers are ranked ii. a queue according to 
their relative trainability for the available jobs. If, in times of 
recession, unemployment increases and the job queue lengthens, the 
workers at the back of the queue are not hired. Thus lower educated 
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workers are hit the hardest by a recession. 
For an explanation of the relative increase of the unemployment 
rate of lower educated workers during a cyclical downturn we do not 
need an appeal to some form of job competition. A competing 
explanation starts from the well-documented difference in adjustment 
costs, when employing skilied or unskilled workers (see e.g. Nickell 
(1986), section 2; in a recent study Pfann and Palm (1990) find that 
the adjustment costs are 50% larger for white-collar workers). Because 
skill and the required level of education are highly correlated, we 
expect that the direct and indirect, i.e. due to lost investment in 
the employee, adjustment costs increase sharply with the educational 
level. As a consequence, the adjustment of the employment of higher 
educated workers will be much slower than that of lower educated 
workers. Hence, during a cyclical downturn lower educated workers will 
be dismissed before higher educated workers, and this order will 
result in a relatively high unemployment rate of lower educated 
workers. 
Note that differential adjustment costs and job competition 
both explain the relatively high unemployment rate of lower educated 
workers. However in the job competition theory the cause is a decline 
in the share of lower educated workers in the flow of new hires, while 
in the differential adjustment cost explanation the cause is an 
increase in the share of lower educated workers in the layoffs. To 
distinguish empirically between both explanations we require 
information on the composition of the flows of new hires and layoffs. 
In a recent study Teulings and Koopmanschap (1989) have related 
the change in the distribution of employment over educational levels 
for a number of labour markets distinguished by occupation and region 
to the change in the unemployment rate at the various levels of 
education in regional labour markets. As the change in the employment 
share of a particular level of education in a particular submarket is 
approximately proportional to the change in the relative unemployment 
rate at the relevant level in that submarket, the positive association 
that is found by Teulings and Koopmanschap is a confirmation of the 
divergence of the unemployment rates by educational level as 
documented in figure 1. Teulings and Koopmanschap consider this 
positive correlation as evidence for job competition. We have argued 
that the same correlation can be explained by differential adjustment 
costs, and information on gross flows into and out of employment (from 
and to unemployment, respectively) is needed to distinguish between 
the hypotheses. In section 4 we estimate the effect of an increase in 
unemployment at a particular level of education on the flow of new 
hires at a lower level of education. This gives a direct estimate of 
the degree of job competition. 
3. MATCHING UNEMPLOYMENT AND VACANCIES AND JOB COMPETITION 
Job competition between workers of different educational levels 
may occur if it is profitable for an unemployed worker to search for a 
job at a lower level of education. 
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Let us consider an unemployed worker with educational level i, 
who has to decide to search for a job of either educational level i or 
educational level i-1. We assume that if he searches for a job at 
level i he is part of the pool of unemployed workers who search for a 
job at level i . The wage for a job at educational level i is W± and 
the search duration is T±. If he searches for a job at level i-1 he is 
part of the pool of unemployed workers searching for jobs at level 
i-1, with wage W^j^ (Hij.-! < WA) and a search duration of Ti_1. The 
unemployed worker receives unemployment benefits at rate B. 
Furthermore we assume that accepted jobs last f orever. Note that this 
assumption implies that there are no employed job seekers. 
The discounted value of search for a job at level i given is equal to: 
0JTi B e~rt dt + Ti;°° W± e"rt dt [1] 
which we can write as 
B/r + [•(Wi-B)/r] e"rTi [2] 
Assuming that the duration of search'is exponentially distributed with 
hazard rate 8t, the value of search at level i is 
VSL = B/r + (Wi-B).Öi/[r.(r+ffi)] [3] 
In the same way we can derive the value of search at level i-1 
VS^i = B/r + (W1.1-B)..ffi.1/[r.(r+«i.1)] [4] 
An unemployed worker at level i is indifferent between searching at 
level i or searching at level i-1 if VS± - VSi-i- Using [3] and [4] 
this means that this worker is indifferent if 
*i/'i-i " (Wi.1-B)/[(Wi-B)+(Wi-Wi.1),(?i.1/r] [5] 
In [5] the ratio of the search hazards is equal to the ratio of the 
return from employment at level i-1 and the sum of the return from 
employment at level i and the capitalized expected yield of searching 
at level i rather than at level i-1. 
Note that since Wi.1<Wi, equation [5] states that in an 
equilibrium with search at level i-1 6L < 8i.1. So an equilibrium 
situation with search at level i-1 by unemployed workers at level i 
requires the search duration at level i to be longer than the search 
duration at level i-1. Furthermore it follows that the larger the wage 
differential between the educational levels, the larger the difference 
between the search durations must be. 
The search duration at the different educational levels is 
influenced by the decision to search at a lower level. The search 
duration oZ an individual worker at level i will depend on both the 
number of unemployed workers that search at that level and on the 
number of vacancies at that level: the more unemployed workers search 
at level i, the longer the expected search duration for an individual 
worker, and the more vacancies at level i the shorter the expected 
search duration for an individual worker. 
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The search duratioris of unemployed workers depend on the 
matching technology and the supply-demand conditions. To foraalize 
this relationship we use a matching function, which specifies the flow 
of filled job vacancies as a function of the number of unemployed and 
the number of vacancies. We specify the matching function as a 
constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas function 
F - k . UQ . V1'" [6] 
in which: F = flow of filled job vacancies 
U = unemployment 
V = vacancies 
k - efficiency parameter 
er «- scale parameter 
Matching functions as in [6] have been estimated using time 
series data for different countries. Blanchard and Diamond (1989) use 
American data, Jackman, Layard and Pissarides (1989) use British data 
and Van Ours (1991) uses Dutch data. 
In this study we specify a matching function for each 
educational level. If we assume that a fraction XL of the unemployed 
workers at level i searches at level i-1, we may specify [6] for both 
educational levels as 
F± - k . [(l-Ai).Ui]Q.[Vi]1-Q 
Fi-l = k • ïUi-i + A1.Ui]a.[Vi_1]1-0 [7] 
The hazard rate 6i for the duration of search of the unemployed 
workers at level i is equal to the ratio of the flow F^. and the stock 
of unemployed workers who search at level i. 
Therefore 
Bt - k . [{(l-A^.UiJAil*"1 
ei.l - k . [ i v i _ 1 + \ i . v i ) / v i _ 1 ] Q - 1 [8] 
We define 
* - {(Wi.1-B)/[(Wi-B)+(Wi-Wi.1).0i.1/rJ)1/(1-Q) [9] 
Note that since Wi.1<Wi it follows that 0<$<1 
Using [5] and [8]-[9] we find that \L satisfies 
(Ui-i+Ai-Uil/V^ - <È> . (1-Aj.Ui/V, [10] 
from which we derive 
XL - [«.UiVi-i-Ui-iVJ/IS.UiV^+U.VJ [11] 
In equilibrium there is job competition at level i-1 if X^O, so if 
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UiAi > (l/ïj.üi.^t-i [12] 
If the wages at levels i and i-1 are the same, the condition for 
workers of level i to search at level i-1 is that the UV ratio at 
level i is larger than the UV ratio at level i-1. In other words: if 
wages at both levels are equal workers of level i search at level i-1 
until the UV ratio's at both levels are equal. If Wi_1<Wi a necessary 
but not sufficiënt condition for an unemployed worker at level i to 
search below his educational level is that the UV-ratio is lower at 
the lower level of education. 
Table 1 gives the differences in UV ratio's between educational 
level for 4 occupational categories. For unemployed workers with an 
academie education the expected search duration at their own 
educational level is higher than that at the higher vocational level. 
For all other workers the expected search duration at a lower 
educational level is higher than at their own level, so there is no 
incentive to search at a lower level of education. Therefore we 
conclude from table 1 that the necessary condition for job competition 
is only fulfilled at the higher vocational level. 
Relation [12] suggests a simple rule that can be used to detect 
educational levels at which job competition may occur. In Thurow's 
labour queue model it is taken for granted, that unemployed workers 
look for a job below their level of education. The analysis in this 
section shows, that this is not true if higher educated workers, who 
search at the lower level, have the same search duration as the lower 
educated workers. Insofar this is not true job competition may occur, 
even if [12] does not hold. In the next section we estimate the degree 
of job competition at various levels of education, and we shall 
compare the results with the predictions of table 1. 
4. DATA AND ESTIMATION RESULTS 
The data used in the analysis are from eight vacancy surveys 
conducted by the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). These 
surveys were held in the months October 1980-1983, September 1984 and 
January 1986-1988. The vacancy survey is a stratified random sample in 
which data are collected of some 20,000 employers. The stratification 
is by size of establishment and by industry. Government agencies 
(central and locc.1), education institutions and temporary employment 
agencies are excluded from the survey. The employers in the surveyed 
population account for 80-85% of total employment. 
From the surveys we obtained the number and the incomplete 
duration of job vacancies distinguished by level of education and 
occupational category. We distinguish between 4 levels of education 
(average years of schooling is given between parenthesis): primary 
(9), secondary (12), higher vocational (15) and academie (18) and 4 
occupational categories: clerical, technical, medical and (socio) 
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cultural1. The incomplete duration was recorded in intervals: 0-1, 1-
3, 3-6 and 6+ months. We used the grouped duration data to calculate 
completed durations by estimating Proportional Hazard Models for job 
vacancies distinguished by level of education and occupational 
category, using dummy variables for the years of the survey as 
regressors (See for details of the method used: Van Ours and Ridder 
(1991)). Next we calculated flow data by dividing the number of 
vacancies by the average completed vacancy durations. These data give 
the flow of filled job vacancies2. The numbers of unemployed workers 
distinguished by level of education and occupational category were 
obtained from the Dutch Central Planning Bureau (CPB)3. 
In our empirical analysis we specify the matching function at 
two levels i and i-1 in year t as: 
Fi(t - expGS,, + Sj^dj + ^,t)-<(l^i)-Ui,t)Q-Vi,t1"Q 
Fi-i.t " exp(/30 + Sj^dj + Ci-i.tMUi.!,, + \i.Vi.t)a.Vi-1.t1-a [13] 
In [13] the dj are dummy variables for the occupational categories 
(technical = reference category). The error terms £ i t and £i-iit a r e 
interpreted as random shocks to the matching efficiency and are 
assumed to be uncorrelated over time. Because Fx t is obtained by 
dividing V± t by the average vacancy duration at level i in year t, we 
may question the exogeneity of Vx t (and Vi.1 t in the equation for 
Fi-i.t)-
Af ter taking logarithms we estimate the equation in [13] by 
Non-Linear Least Squares*. We must estimate two equations at a time in 
1
 To clarify the nature of the classification we give some 
examples: Technical (CBS classification: 3): Architect, engineer, 
plumber, painter, weider. Medical (5): Physician, medical 
receptionist, mid-wife, physio-therapist, pharmacist. Clerical (6): 
Economist, secretary, typist, salesman. (Socio-) Cultural (7 and 8): 
Social worker, personnel officer, waiter/waitress, artist, barber. 
2
 Of course, these computed flows are only correct if the number 
of vacancies is approximately constant over time, which is obviously 
not true. However, because the inflow and outflow rates are large 
relatively to the stock of vacancies, equilibrium is quickly re-
established after shocks to either the inflow or the outflow rate. 
Direct estimates of the in- or outflow rates are difficult to obtain. 
3
 The unemployment data of the CPB are quarterly data. We used 
the data from the third quarters of 1980-1984 and the fourth quarters 
of 1985-1987. 
4
 To account for possible endogeneity of VA t we also computed 
Instrumental-Variable estimates. As an instrument for the number of 
vacancies at the survey date we used the vacancy inflow prior tot the 
survey date. The estimation results were obtained with the TSP routine 
that computes Non-Linear 2SLS, using a method developed by Amemiya 
(1974). The estimation results in Appendix 1 show there is not much 
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order to identify X±. We assume. that the efficiency of the labour 
market does not depend on the educational level. The equation allows 
for differences in efficiency between occupational categories. The 
estimation results are shown in table 25. 
The first column presents the estimation results for primary 
and secondary education, the second column those for secondary and 
higher vocational education and the third column those for higher 
vocational and academie education. These three estimates are in many 
respects similar. First, there are differences in labour market 
efficiency between types of education. The market for technical 
workers has the lowest efficiency, that for medical workers the 
highest. The efficiency of the market for clerical and socio-cultural 
workers is about the same in all estimates. Also, the parameter a of 
the matching function does not differ much and is about 0.3. 
The main difference between the estimates are the results with 
respect to the job competition parameter. This parameter is not 
significant at levels 2 and 3, the level of primary and secondary 
education. The parameter of level 4, the level of higher vocational 
education is significant, indicating job competition between workers 
with a higher vocational education and academie workers. 
In the fourth column we specify the job competition parameter 
AA as a function of the difference in UV-ratio at the academie and 
higher vocational educational level. As hypothesized in section 3 AA 
also depends on dif f erences in wages at both levels, but we have no 
data on this. We specified AA as: 
X„ - exp(0o + ^ . ( U ^ - U a / V g V U •+ exp(tf0 + 4>1. (U4/V< -U3/V3> > U*] 
The coëfficiënt <f>1 is not significant, although it has the correct 
sign. 
All in all the estimation results in table 2 indicate that, 
except for the higher vocational level, there is no evidence of job 
competition. More precisely, only at the higher vocational level the 
flow of filled vacancies is affected by the level of unemployment at 
the next higher level of education. This result is consistent with the 
prediction of table 1. However, an inspection of figure 1 does not 
lead to this conclusion: the unemployment rates of workers with a 
higher vocational and academie training do not diverge dramatically. 
The unemployment rates of workers with an education at the primary and 
secondary l«~vel do diverge dramatically and those for workers with a 
secondary and higher vocational training do so to a lesser extent. 
Therefore, it is no surprise that 'direct' estimates, as those 
obtained by Teulings and Koopmanschap, lead to the conclusion that 
there is job competition at these levels. As argued before, the 
interpretation of these 'direct' estimates is ambiguous, and our 
difference with the results obtained with NLS. 
5
 Because the observation refer to time intervals at different 
lengths, testing for serial correlation is not straightforward. 
Inspection of the residuals did not point at serial correlation. 
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results, that provide a direct test of the presence of higher educated 
workers in queues for jobs that require only a lower level of 
education show that they are misleading: there is no evidence of job 
competition at the primary and secondary level, despite diverging 
unemployment rates. 
5. CONCLUSION 
With our results we can unequivocally reject the existence of 
job competition at lower, i.e. primary and secondary, levels of 
education. Moreover, we can explain why previous authors have 
concluded that job competition is important. The observation that 
unemployment rates diverge during a cyclical downturn is by itself not 
sufficiënt to prove the existence of job competition. A direct test of 
the crowding-out hypothesis must be based on a study of the 
composition of new hires over the cycle, and this is what our test 
does. 
A possible explanation of the diverging unemployment rates 
during a cyclical downturn, is that employers dismiss replaceable 
lower educated workers before irreplaceable higher educated workers. 
For a test of this hypothesis we need data on the composition of the 
inflow into unemployment (from employment) over the cycle. In the 
Netherlands inflow data classified by level of education are not 
available, and even estimates based on unemployment durations by 
education category can not be obtained. Related evidence for the UK 
and the USA is given by Layard, Nickell and Jackman ((1991), table 3, 
p 45), and this evidence shows that in 1984 and 1987 respectively the 
difference in unemployment rates between skill groups is due to 
differences in the inflow rate and not in the duration of 
unemployment. Of course, this evidence is not conclusive. 
More insight into the reason why unemployment rates diverge is 
important, because the job competition and the differential adjustment 
cost hypotheses have radically different implications for the 
effectiveness of schooling. Schooling is ineffective and only leads to 
a redistribution of unemployment, if job competition is important. If 
however, because of high adjustment costs, employers hang on to better 
educated workers then schooling may reduce the difference in the 
unemployment rates, thereby decreasing the total unemployment rate. 
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Figure 1 Unemployment bv educa t iona l l e v e l (% of t he labour force a t 
t he r e l e v a n t level ' ) 
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Figure 2 Average required educational level for new iob vacancies: 
1980-1988 
I 
1 
socio-coltual 
a) Calculations of the average level based on 
the assumption that primary education = 9 
years, secondary = 12 years, higher 
vocational - 15 years, academie = 18 years 
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Table 1 Average difference in unemplovment-vacancv ratio 
between educational levels: 1980-19883} 
Occupational 
category 
Ui/Vi-U^/V,., 
i=2 i=3 i=4 
Technical 
Medical 
Socio-cultural 
Clerical 
-16.0 -10.8 1.6 
-1.8 4.0 
-16.7 -1.8 19.9 
-8.2 -8.2 1.0 
i = level of education; 1 = primary, 2 - secondary, 
3 — hLgher vocational, 4 — academie 
Table 2 Estimation results: job competition bv educational level 
1. 2. 3. 4. 
Constant -1.06 (3.1) -1.15 (8.1) -1.06 (8.8) -1.08 (9.0) 
yS medical 0.88 (6.8) 0.88 (7.0) 0.89 (7.4) 0.90 (7.5) 
/9 clerical 0.56 (4.6) 0.58 (4.9) 0.60 (5.1) 0.57 (5.1) 
f} soc-cult 0.45 (3.5) 0.43 (3.4) 0.43 (3.5) 0.47 (3.7) 
a 0.30 (6.5) 0.32 (6.8) 0.32 (7.2) 0.32 (7.4) 
*2 0.06 (0.3) 
*3 -0.41 (1.3) 
*A 0.60 (5.1) 
*o -0.02 (0.0) 
*i 0.07 (1.4) 
R2 0.872 0.874 0.887 0.857 
t-values between parenthesis 
Appendix 1 ESTIMATION RESULTS INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE ESTIMATION 
1. 2. 3. 4. 
Constant -1.03 (6.7) -1.22 (6.2) -1.02 (6.7) -1.01 (6.0) 
p medical 0.87 (6.8) 0.90 (6.9) 0.89 (7.3) 0.88 (7.1) 
f3 clerical 0.55 (4.5) 0.59 (4.9) 0.56 (4.9) 0.55 (4.8) 
/S soc-cult 0.47 (3.4) 0.40 (2.7) 0.45 (3.3) 0.45 (3.0) 
a 0.28 (4.4) 0.36 (4.4) 0.30 (4.8) 0.29 (4.3) 
A2 0.10 (0.4) 
*3 -0.49 (1.5) 
AA 0.62 (4.7) 
<t>0 1.05 (1.7) 
*i 0.06 (0.8) 
R2 0.895 0.898 0.890 0.887 
t-values between parenthesis 
12 
